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Abstract
Language change takes place primarily via diffusion of linguistic variants in a population of individuals. Identifying selective
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the simulation results of a computer model that follows the Po ´lya-urn dynamics, we analyze theoretically a variety of factors
that could affect language change, including variant prestige, transmission error, individual influence and preference, and
social structure. Among these factors, variant prestige is identified as the sole selective pressure, whereas others help
modulate the degree of diffusion only if variant prestige is involved. This multidisciplinary study discerns the primary and
complementary roles of linguistic, individual learning, and socio-cultural factors in language change, and offers insight into
empirical studies of language change.
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Introduction
Language is a dynamic complex adaptive system [1] that
undergoes constant changes [2]. Well-documented examples of
language change include: the Great Vowel Shift in English during
the 14th to 16th century [3], the phonological mergers in Sinitic
languages [4], the lexical borrowing among languages [5,6], and so
on. Many changes were achieved via variant diffusion (shift in
proportions of different variants used by a population of individuals
over time [7], henceforth ‘‘diffusion’’). Regarding the numerous
diffusion cases, linguists are curious about the general ways in which
diffusion takes place and the separate or collective effects of various
factors on this process, with the purpose of identifying selective
pressures on diffusion (factors that explicitly and consistently drive the
diffusion of particular variants in a population) and gaining insights
on the human cognitive capacity for language [8–12].
Mathematical analysis and computer simulation have recently
joined the endeavor to study questions of language evolution. By
quantifying contact patterns and constraints within or across popu-
lations, mathematical analysis helps predict the outcome of language
competition [13–18]; by simulating individual behaviors during
linguistic interactions, computer modeling helps trace: how local
interactions among individuals spur the origin of a common set of
lexical items [19,20], how processing constraints lead to linguistic
regularities [21,22], and how social connections affect diffusion
[23,24].
As for diffusion in particular, the simulation approach usually
defines two types of variants (changed (C) and unchanged (U) forms) and
relevant rules to select C or U. As in [23,24], individuals are
situated in social networks, and choose their forms based on the
forms their neighbors (individuals directly connected to them) use
and the functional bias between C and U. By repetitively updating
individuals’ forms and calculating the proportions of C and U in
the population, these studies evaluate the threshold problem (minimum
bias for C to diffuse in the whole population [23]) and the effect of
social structures on diffusion. Meanwhile, the mathematical
approach usually treats diffusion as a Markov chain, and defines
differential equations describing changes among different language
states. As in [13], two states, X and Y, are defined. Change in the
proportion of the population using X is defined in (1), where x and
y are proportions of individuals respectively using X and Y, Pyx(x,s)
is the probability of converting from Y to X, and Pxy(x,s) is the
probability of a reverse conversion:
dx
dt
~yPyx(x,s){xPxy(x,s) ð1Þ
Here, Pyx(x,s)=cx
as, Pxy(x,s)=c(1-x)
a(1-s), and c, s and a define the
attractiveness of X or Y. Change in the proportion of the
population using Y can be defined similarly. Analysis on these
equations can reveal some stable states of the system. The later
work [16] extends [13] by including a bilingual state (Z) and
redefining the transition equations.
Both of these approaches bear some limitations. On the one
hand, simulations are sensitive to initial conditions; without
support from mathematical analysis, simulations only offer
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ical analysis can efficiently overcome this limitation. As in [25], the
authors unify the two sets of equations in [13] and [16] with agent-
based simulations, and discover that individuals’ willingness to
change languages is prominent for diffusion of a more attractive
language and bilingualism accelerates the disappearance of one of
the competing languages. On the other hand, Markov models
usually involve many parameters and face a ‘‘data scarcity’’
problem (how to effectively estimate the parameter values based
upon insufficient empirical data). In addition, the number of
parameters increases exponentially with the increase in the
number of states. As in [13,16], adding a bilingual state extends
the parameter set from [c, s, a]t o[ cxz, cyz, czx, czy, s, a].
In this paper, we apply the principles of population genetics
[26,27] to language, and combine the simulation and mathematical
approaches to study diffusion. We borrow the Price equation [28] from
evolutionary biology to identify selective pressures on diffusion.
Though originally proposed using biological terms, this equation is
applicable to any group entity that undergoes transmission in a
socio-cultural environment [29–31], and involves components that
indicate selective pressures at the population level. In addition, this
equation relies upon average performance to identify selective
pressures, which partials out the influence of initial conditions.
Furthermore, compared with Markov chains, this equation needs
fewer parameters, which can be estimated from few empirical data.
Apart from this equation, we also implement a multi-agent model
that follows the Po ´lya urn dynamics from contagion research [32,33].
This model simulates production, perception, and update of
variants during linguistic interactions, and can be easily coordinated
with the Price equation.
Empirical studies in historical linguistics and sociolinguistics
have shown that linguistic, individual learning and socio-cultural
factors could all affect diffusion [8,10,34,35]. In this paper, we
focus on some of these factors (e.g., variant prestige, transmission
error, individual influence and preference, and social structure),
and analyze whether they are selective pressures on diffusion and
how non-selective factors modulate the effect of selective pressures.
Methods
Price Equation
Biomathematics literature contains several mathematical mod-
els of evolution via natural selection, among which the most well-
known ones are: (a) the replicator dynamics [36], used in the context of
evolutionary game theory to study frequency dependent selection;
and (b) the quasi-species model [37], applicable to processes with
constant type-dependent fitness and directed mutations. A third
member of this family is the Price equation [28,38], which is
mathematically similar to the previous two (see [30]), but has a
slightly different conceptual background.
The Price equation is a general description of evolutionary
change, applying to any mode of transmission, including genetics,
learning, and culture [30,39]. It describes the changing rate of (the
population average of) some quantitative character in a population
that undergoes evolution via (possibly non-faithful) replication and
natural selection. A special case thereof is the proportion of a
certain type in the entire population, which is the character
primarily studied by the other two models abovementioned.
In the discrete-time version, the Price equation takes the form as
in (2):
DX~Cov(si=s,xi)zE(Dxi|si=s) ð2Þ
Here, X is the population average of the quantitative trait to be
studied, and this difference equation denotes the time evolution of
this trait. The population is assumed to be divided into sub-
populations (single individuals or more coarse-grained aggregate
objects). Term s refers to the average fitness of the population, and
xi, Dxi and si respectively denote the average value of x, the
difference of this value between subsequent generations, and the
average fitness of the ith sub-population.
The right-hand side of the equation consists of two terms: a
covariance and an expectation. The covariance measures the
statistical association between fitness and trait value. It captures
evolutionary changes due to selection between sub-populations;
the stronger the selection for x, the stronger the covariance
between x and fitness. The expectation is a fitness-weighted measure
of the change in trait value between ancestor and descendant. It
tracks changes occurring in sub-populations. If sub-populations
are single individuals, the expectation captures unfaithful replica-
tion due to mutation or transmission errors; and if sub-populations
are more coarse-grained, the covariance captures between-group
selection, and the expectation captures both transmission errors
and within-group selection.
It is important to note the apparently tautological nature of the
Price equation. This nature makes it suitable for describing any
dynamic process involving populations at different time points. If
there is a complete specification of a dynamic process (say, by
means of a Markov chain), the description, by means of the Price
equation, of the same process will logically follow the specification.
In other words, the Price equation description might be equivalent
to the complete dynamic specification, or even contain less
information. However, it does not mean that this equation is an
alternative to Markov chains or similar specifications of dynamic
systems; rather, this equation is a conceptual means. Applying this
equation requires clarifying what relations between the stages of
the involved population can be considered as replication (Price
himself did not use this term, but Dawkins’ usage of the term [40]
is precisely what Price’s theory is about). It then provides a clear
separation in the population between those changes due to selection
and those due to other sources. Some scholars criticize Price’s
approach precisely because the Price equation does not add ant
new information to an existing specification of a dynamic process
(see for instance [41]), but these critiques do not affect the value of
this equation as a conceptual means.
The Price equation can predict the evolution of trait X at the
population level, provided the dynamics within sub-populations is well-
understood. It has proven useful especially in clarifying the concept of
group selection, since it gives a precise description of the interplay
between inter- and intra-group selective forces [39,42]. To our
knowledge, most applications use this equation as an analytical tool to
derive the dynamic behavior of an aggregate system from the
dynamic properties of its components. In this paper, we present
another application of this equation, namely as an empirical tool. The
right-hand side of this equation divides the population-level
dynamics into inter- and intra-group selections, plus unfaithful
replication. In systems that intra-group selection can be neglected,
this corresponds to a division between selection and unfaithful
replication. In this way, the Price equation decomposes an
empirically observed dynamic process into components respectively
tracing selection and unfaithful replication, with the purpose of
better understanding the nature of this process.
Thispaperstudiessimulationsofrathersimpledynamic processes
inspired by certain features of diffusion. Due to a complex
population structure, it is nevertheless not possible (or at least not
practical) to give an analytical treatment. However, the Price
equation, used in a top-down fashion as described above, serves as a
tool to measure the selection strength in different scenarios, thus
enabling a deeper understanding of the macroscopic properties of
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methodology, we envision practical applications of this approach
to non-simulation data from biological and/or cultural evolutions.
Po ´lya-urn Model
This model, first designed to study contagion, serves as a
suitable model studying diffusion within a population. A Po ´lya-urn
is an urn containing a number of red and green balls; at each time
step, a ball is drawn randomly from the urn, and returned to it
together with a number of balls of the same or different color. This
process is then iterated.
Our model, inspired from this prototypical one, consists of N
agents (individuals), each denoted by an urn. An urn is initiated
with V tokens, each belonging to a particular type (v1, v2,…vV) and
having a quantifiable feature xi (all feature values form F). At a time
step, an interaction occurs between two or more individuals, where
a token vi is drawn randomly from an urn (speaker), and pi (prestige
of vi, all prestige values form P) tokens of the same type are added
to the speaker itself or other urn(s) (hearer(s)). Here, token drawing
corresponds to production, and token adding perception and knowledge
update. Such drawing and adding processes repeat themselves,
causing variant type distributions in each urn and the whole
population to change over time. Unfaithful replication may occur if
an added token has a different type from the drawn one.
This Po ´lya-urn model is combinable with the Price equation. We
give two examples (see Figure 1) of calculating the Price equation
based on this model, under a simple setting: N=2,V=2,F={1.0,
2.0}, i.e., the population has only two agents who exchange only two
types ofvariants. During interactions,onlyhearers updatetheir urns.
There are two ways to calculate the Price equation, respectively
based on two quantifiable features, both reflecting change in the
variant type distribution in the population. The first way concerns
variant feature xi, and calculates change in the average feature
value DX between time steps. As in Figure 1(a), the numbers of
variants before (wi) and after (w9i) the interaction are:
w1~3,w2~2,w~
X
i
wi~5 and
w0
1~3,w0
2~4,w0~
X
i
w0
i~7
ð3Þ
The relative frequencies (qi) and fitness (si) of variants are
q1~w1=w~3=5~0:6 and q2~w2=w~2=5~0:4 ð4Þ
s1~w0
1=w1~1,s2~w0
2=w2~2 and s~w0=w~1:4 ð5Þ
Then, the covariance is
E(si=s)~
X
i
qi|si=s~0:6|1=1:4z0:4|2=1:4~1:0
E(xi)~
X
i
wi=w|xi~3=5|1:0z2=5|2:0~1:4
Cov(si=s,xi)~E((si=s{E(si=s))(xi{E(xi)))
~
X
i
qi(si=s{1:0)(xi{1:4)
~0:6|(1=1:4{1:0)(1:0{1:4)z
0:4|(2=1:4{1:0)(2:0{1:4)~6=35
ð6Þ
Figure 1. The Po ´lya-urn dynamics (N=2,V=2,F={1.0, 2.0}). Example (a) involves variant prestige (P={1, 2}) but no unfaithful replication. At
time t, a token of v2 is produced by the speaker, due to its prestige (2), two tokens of v2 are added to the hearer, which forms the state at time t9.
Example (b) involves unfaithful replication but no variant prestige (P={1, 1}). At t,av2 is produced, due to unfaithful replication, a v1 is added, which
forms the state at t9.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033171.g001
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their parents, so there is no feature discrepancy, Dxi=0.0. Then,
the expectation is 0.0. In sum, the right-hand side of the Price
equation returns 6/35.
Meanwhile, DX can be calculated based on the expectations of
xi:
X0~Exp(x0
i)~
X
i
x0
i|w0
i=w~1:0|3=7z2:0|4=7~11=7
X~Exp(xi)~
X
i
xi|wi=w~1:0|3=5z2:0|2=5~1:4
DX~X0{X~11=7{1:4~6=35
ð7Þ
Both sides return the same value, illustrating the tautology of the
Price equation.
As in Figure 1(b), w1, w2, and w are the same as in (3), and q1
and q2 the same as in (4). Here, we need to track which parent type
produces the mutated offspring, and calculate the contribution of
both faithfully and unfaithfully replicated tokens to the feature
value. To this purpose, we define niRj as the number of vi changing
to vj. In this example, n1R1=3,n1R2=0,n2R1=1,n2R2=2. Then
w0
1~n1?1zn1?2~3,w0
2~n2?2zn2?1~3 ð8Þ
s1~w0
1=w1~1,s2~w0
2=w2~1:5 and s~w0=w~1:2 ð9Þ
The covariance is:
E(si=s)~
X
i
qi|si=s~0:6|1=1:2z0:4|1:5=1:2~1:0
Cov(si=s,xi)~E((si=s{E(si=s))(xi{E(xi)))
~
X
i
qi(si=s{1:0)(xi{1:4)
~0:6|(1=1:2{1:0)(1:0{1:4)
z0:4|(1:5=1:2{1:0)(2:0{1:4)~0:1
ð10Þ
The feature discrepancies are:
x0
i~
X
j
xj|ni?j=w0
x0
1~x1|n1?1=w0zx2|n1?2=w0~1:0|3=3z2:0|0=3~1:0
x0
2~x1|n2?1=w0zx2|n2?2=w0~1:0|1=3z2:0|2=3~1:5
Dx1~x0
1{x1~0:0 and Dx2~x0
2{x2~{0:5
ð11Þ
The expectation is:
E(si=s|Dxi)
~
X
i
qi| Dxi|si=s~0:6 | 0:0 | 1=1:2z0:4|({0:5)| 1:5=1:2
~{0:25
ð12Þ
In sum, the right-hand side returns 20.15. Meanwhile, DX is:
X0~Exp(x0
i)~
X
i
x0
i|w0
i=w0~1:0|3=6z2:0|3=6
~1:25, X~Exp(xi)~1:4
DX~1:25{1:4~{0:15
ð13Þ
This calculation also returns 20.15.
In Text S1, we illustrate the second way of calculation, also
based on the examples in Figure 1.
These examples show that the Price equation can accurately
trace the evolutionary change in the average value of a
quantifiable feature in a population. The two ways of calculation
identify selective pressures from different angles. DX in the first
way of calculation is determined primarily by the covariance that
traces changes in the fitness ratio, whereas the expectation is zero
except for unfaithful replication. Then, any factor causing the
covariance to be consistently positive or negative can be identified
as a selective pressure. However, in the second way, any factor
causing the expectation to be consistently positive or negative is a
selective pressure.
In our Po ´lya-urn model, terms ‘‘feature’’, ‘‘prestige’’, and
‘‘unfaithful replication’’ have their counterparts in the context of
diffusion. Different types of linguistic variants possess feature values.
Due to certain characteristics, some type of variants can be
adopted and used with a higher probability than other(s). Then,
this type of variants is said to have a higher prestige value. For
example, in [6], borrowed lexical variants tend to have higher
prestige values than existing ones that encode identical meanings,
since the former are more salient to hearers than the latter. Other
characteristics, such as the ease in perception or production, may
also cause variants to have different prestige values [43]. As in
Cantonese, more easily produced pronoun variants ([o5] ‘‘I’’,
[lei5] ‘‘you’’, and [heoi5] ‘‘she/he/it’’, numbers indicate tones)
have higher prestige values than existing forms ([ngo5], [nei5], and
[keoi5]), since the nasals and voiceless plosive in existing forms are
more difficult to produce to normal speakers. Finally, during
cultural transmission, unfaithful replication usually corresponds to
transmission error.
Apart from these terms, this Po ´lya-urn model can also
incorporate other individual learning and socio-cultural factors.
For example, during diffusion, speakers, hearers, or both, can
innovate or have identical or different preferences for variants.
Speakers may prefer easily produced variants, as in the case of
Cantonese pronouns, whereas hearers may prefer easily perceived
or salient ones [4,44]. Such individual preference can be addressed by
clarifying situations where only speakers or hearers update their
urns. In addition, in a human community, individuals having
higher social, political or economic status are more influential than
ordinary people [45,46]. Such individual influence can be addressed
by defining either a non-uniform distribution of individuals’
influences (determining the number of hearers for each agent) or a
non-uniform distribution of individuals’ popularities (determining
the probabilities for agents to participate in interactions). Finally,
social connections among individuals can also restrict participants
of interactions, thus affecting diffusion. This can be addressed
using different types of social structure.
Price Equation & Po ´lya-urn Dynamics in Linguistics
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For the sake of simplicity, we only consider two variant types
(V=2), and arbitrarily set their feature values as F={1.0, 2.0}. In
this case, variant features do not affect the covariance and
expectation, since they are cancelled out in the calculation. In
cases of multiple types of variants, unless certain types of variants
have extremely high or low feature values, variant features will not
greatly affect the covariance and expectation. In reality, feature
values can denote any quantifiable characteristics of variants, such
as vowel length, consonant voicing onset time, lexical item
recalling rate, and so on. We set up a 100-agent population and
2000 interactions among these agents (20 interactions per agent)
(in the later simulations, the number of interactions can be
extended to 5000), and conduct simulations in the following three
conditions:
1) Variant prestige with and without transmission error;
2) Individual influence with and without variant prestige;
3) Individual preference and social structure with and without
variant prestige;
In each condition, 100 simulations are conducted. In a
simulation, we calculate the Price equation at 20 sampling points
evenly distributed along 2000 interactions (in simulations having
5000 interactions, 50 sampling points are selected for calculation).
Since the Price equation traces only changes of variant types, we
also measure Prop at each sampling point as in (14):
Prop(t)~max
i~1,2
(proportion(vi,t)) ð14Þ
The average Prop over 100 simulations helps evaluate the
conclusions drawn from the Price equation. The type of variants
having a higher proportion value is referred to as the majority type.I n
Text S2, we show the pseudo codes of the Po ´lya-urn model and
the calculation of the Price equation.
Variant Prestige with and without Transmission Error
Variant prestige encompasses intrinsic properties of variants, not
of individuals who carry variants. High prestige value makes
certain type of variants more likely to be adopted by individuals. In
the simulations of this section, each interaction takes place
between two randomly chosen agents, and only hearers update
their urns. Variant prestige is introduced via pi. In conditions with
variant prestige, P={1, 2} (conditions P={1, 2} and P={2, 1}
are conceptually the same, except that the dominant variant types
are different); in those without, P={1, 1}. If pi=2, two (instead of
one) tokens of the same type are added to the hearer’s urn,
modeling the enhanced adoption of variants with higher prestige
values. Transmission error is introduced via c=0.02, denoting the
probability for an added token to become a mutant (a token of the
other type).
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the covariance without transmission
error and the expectation with transmission error. With variant
prestige, the covariance is consistently positive; otherwise, it
fluctuates around 0.0. The gradual decrease in the covariance is
due to the increase in the total number of variants, which reduces
the effect of a small number of changed variants in each
interaction. The consistent positivity of the covariance indicates
that variant prestige is a selective pressure on diffusion.
Meanwhile, with variant prestige, the expectation is consistently
negative; otherwise, it fluctuates around 0.0. This indicates that
transmission error reduces the selective pressure of variant
prestige, but due to the low error rate, this effect is smaller than
that of variant prestige.
Figure 2(c) shows Prop in these conditions. With variant prestige,
v2, having a higher prestige value, becomes the majority type, and
its Prop gradually reaches a high level (above 0.8) (Prop never
reaches 1.0, since the tokens of v1 are not removed. When they are
chosen for production, new tokens of v1 will be added); otherwise,
either type can be the majority type in different simulations, and
Prop remains around 0.5. These results confirm the selective
pressure of variant prestige. In addition, Figure 2(c) shows Prop in
conditions with transmission error (dotted lines). With variant
prestige, Prop with transmission error is lower than that without,
indicating that transmission error reduces the selective pressure of
variant prestige; otherwise, Prop with and without transmission
error are similarly low, around 0.5, indicating that transmission
error alone fails to significantly affect diffusion. These findings are
in accordance with the conclusions drawn from the Price equation.
By adjusting prestige values, we can simulate different degrees of
bias for the prestigious type of variants. Adjusting the ratios
between the two types of variants is similar to adjusting the
functional bias as in [23,24]. Figure 3 shows Prop and average
covariance in all the sampling points under different settings of P.
Once a slight bias for v2 is introduced via P, say P={100, 101},
the average covariance will become consistently positive, and the
proportion of v2 will be above 0.5. In addition, the average
Figure 2. Results of variant prestige and transmission error: (a) covariance without transmission error; (b) expectation with
transmission error; (c) Prop. Each line is averaged over 100 simulations. Percentage values in the legends denote the proportions of the
covariance or expectation above, below or equal to 0.0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033171.g002
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for v2. It means that not only the consistent positivity or negativity
of the covariance can reflect selective pressures on diffusion, but
the average covariance can also indicate the strength of selection
and the degree of diffusion. This is also confirmed by Prop.
At the population level, the Price equation and simulation
results collectively show that: (a) variant prestige is a selective
pressure on diffusion; (b) transmission error can diminish such
pressure; and (c) transmission error alone fails to consistently drive
diffusion (noting this, we will not consider transmission error in
later sections). These conclusions are different from those drawn
from an empirical study [45], which finds no effect of variant
prestige on diffusion, but the authors of that study admit that their
focus is on individual bias and variant prestige is subsumed within
that focus.
These conclusions are based on simulations in a finite
population and within a limited number of interactions. In Text
S3, we prove that these conclusions also hold in a sufficiently large
population and an unlimited number of interactions. Meanwhile,
single histories of the Po ´lya-urn dynamics tend to show the
reinforcement or lock-in effect [46]. As shown in Figure S1 and
discussed in Text S4, such effect cannot affect our conclusions.
Individual Influence with and without Variant Prestige
Individual influence reflects the fact that members in a
community tend to copy the way of certain individuals. Such
factor is claimed to be able to enhance the benefit of cultural
transmission [47]. In our study, individual influence is discussed in
two ways. In the first way, we define a non-uniform distribution of
individuals’ influences. When an individual speaks, according to its
influence, a certain number of other individuals will be randomly
chosen as hearers and update their urns according to the token
produced by the speaker. Each individual has an equal chance to
be chosen as speaker, but the distribution of all individuals’
influences follows a power-law distribution [49,50] (inspired from the
data in [47], and used in [48]). The power-law distribution has the
form y~ax{l, where x is the agent index from 1 to N, y is the
influence an agent has, and a is a normalizing factor ensuring that
the sum of all probabilities is 1.0. The maximum integer smaller
than N6y is the number of hearers influenced by an agent with
index x. The minimum value of this number is 1. l characterizes
different power-law distributions; the higher the l, the more
hearers when agents with smaller indices speak.
In the second way, we define a power-law distribution of
individual popularities (probabilities for individuals to participate in
interactions). In this power-law, y measures the probability for an
individual to interact (as speaker or hearer) with others.
We consider power-law distributions whose l are 0.0, 1.0, 1.5,
2.0, 2.5, and 3.0. l values in many real-world power-law
distributions usually fall in this range. If l is 0.0, all agents have
the same influence or probability, which resembles the case of
random interaction. Values within (0.0 1.0) are excluded, because
the influences or probabilities under these values are sensitive to
the population size.
Figures 4 and 5 show the results under these two types of
individual influence. Without variant prestige, both types fail to
exert a selective pressure, indicated by the fluctuation of the
covariance; otherwise, both can affect diffusion. As shown in
Figures 4(c) and 5(c), l and Prop are correlated. To illustrate such
correlation, we define MaxRange as the maximum changing range
of Prop:
MaxRange~ max
t[½1,2000 
(Prop(t){Prop(0)) ð15Þ
Figures 4(d) and 5(d) compare MaxRange with and without
variant prestige. With variant prestige, under the first type of
individual influence, there is a negative correlation between l and
MaxRange (Figure 4(d)). With the increase in l, agents with smaller
indices become more influential, who can affect many others,
whereas those with bigger indices are less influential, who can only
affect 1 or 2 agents. Then, if the influential agents have not
developed a clear bias for the prestigious type of variants, their
great influence will delay the spread of such bias among others.
However, under the second type of individual influence, there is a
positive correlation between l and MaxRange (Figure 5(d)). With
the increase in l, agents with smaller indices will participate in
Figure 3. Results under different variant prestige (P): (a) average covariance under different P; (b) Prop. Bars in (a) denote standard
errors. Each line in (b) is averaged over 100 simulations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033171.g003
Price Equation & Po ´lya-urn Dynamics in Linguistics
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e33171more interactions than others. Then, the proportions of prestigious
variants in these agents will have more chances to increase, and
the bias for prestigious variants in these agents can get spread to
others. Therefore, the diffusion in the whole population is
accelerated.
Power-law distribution is omnipresent in social and cognitive
domains [51]. We show that in order for the two types of power-
law distributed individual influence to significantly affect diffusion,
variant prestige is necessary.
Individual Preference and Social Prestige with and
without Variant Prestige
In the above simulations, only hearers update their urns. As
discussed before, speakers may also update their urns during
interactions. These different ways of introducing new tokens may
affect diffusion in a multi-agent population. Meanwhile, a multi-
agent population possesses different types of social structure, which
could also affect diffusion. Simulations in this section adopt
complex networks (treating agents as nodes and interactions as
edges) to denote social connections among individuals. We
consider 6 types of networks: fully-connected network, star
network, scale-free network, small-world network, two-dimension-
al (2D) lattice, and ring. They characterize many real-world
communities. For instance, small-scale societies are usually fully-
connected, or have a star-like, centralized structure. Social
connections among geographically distributed communities can
be denoted by rings or 2D lattices. Large-scale societies generally
show small-world and/or scale-free characteristics [47].
Table 1 lists the average degree (AD, average number of edges per
node), clustering coefficient (probability for neighbors, directly
connected nodes, of a node to be neighbors themselves) and
average shortest path length (ASPL, average smallest number of edges,
via which any two nodes in the network can connect to each other)
of these networks. Seen from Table 1, from ring to 2D lattice or
small-world network, AD increases; from 2D lattice to small-world
or scale-free network, ASPL drops, due to short-cuts (edges between
non-locally distributed nodes) in small-world network and hubs
(nodes having many edges connecting others) in scale-free
Figure 4. Results with the first type of individual influence: covariance without (a) and with (b) variant prestige; Prop with variant
prestige (c), and MaxRange (d). Each line in (a–c) is averaged over 100 simulations. Bars in (d) denote standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033171.g004
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star network, level of centrality (LC) increases, more nodes become
connected to some popular node(s).
In order to gather sufficient data for statistical analysis, we
extend the number of interactions to 5000 (50 interactions per
agent) and the number of sampling points to 50. There are two sets
Figure 5. Results with the second type of individual influence: covariance without (a) and with (b) variant prestige, Prop with
variant prestige (c), and MaxRange (d). Each line in (a–c) is averaged over 100 simulations. Bars in (d) denote standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033171.g005
Table 1. Network characteristics: values are calculated based on 100 nodes.
Network Average degree Clustering coefficient Shortest path length
Fully-connected 99 1.0 1
Star 1.98 0.0 1.98
Scale-free 3.94 (4e-14) 0.14 (0.038) 3.01 (0.071)
Small-world 4 0.17 (0.031) 3.79 (0.086)
2D lattice 4 0.5 12.88
Ring 2 0.0 25.25
Scale-free network is formed by preferential attachment, with average degree around 4; small-world network is formed by rewiring from 2D lattice, with reviewing rate
as 0.1. Numbers within brackets are standard deviations of values in scale-free and small-world networks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033171.t001
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speakers update their urns; and (b) simulations with hearer’s preference,
where only hearers update their urns. In both sets, simulations
under the 6 types of network are conducted. In a simulation, only
two directly connected agents can interact. Considering that one-
speaker-multiple-hearers interactions are common in real societies,
we also conduct simulations where all agents directly connected to
the speaker can be hearers and update their urns (hearer’s
preference). These results are shown in Figure S2 and discussed in
Text S5.
Figure 6 shows the simulation results with hearer’s preference
(results with speaker’s preference are similar). Figures 6(a) and 6(b)
show that without variant prestige, the covariance fluctuates
around 0.0; otherwise, it is consistently positive. Figures 6(c) and
6(d) respectively show Prop and MaxRange in those networks, given
variant prestige.
Based on Prop, we conduct a 2-way analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) (dependent variable: Prop over 100 simulations; fixed
factors: speaker’s/hearer’s preference and 6 types of networks;
covariate: 50 sampling points along 5000 interactions). This
analysis reveals that speaker’s or hearer’s preference (F(1,
61187)=6905.606, p,.001, gp
2=.101) and networks (F(5,
61187)=1111.425, p,.001, gp
2=.083) have significant main
effects on Prop (Figure 7). The covariate, number of interactions
(sampling points), is significantly related with Prop (F(1,
61187)=108285.542, p,.001, gp
2=.639). Instead of ANOVA,
using ANCOVA can partial out the influence of the number of
interactions.
Figure 7(a) shows that hearer’s preference leads to a higher
degree of diffusion, compared with speaker’s preference. This is
evident in not only fully-connected network, which resembles the
case of random interactions and excludes network effects, but also
other types of networks.
During one interaction, whether the speaker or hearer updates
the urn has the same effect on the variant type distribution within
these two contacting agents. However, in a situation of multiple
agents and iterated interactions, these two types of preference
show different effects. Speaker’s preference is self-centered, disre-
garding other agents. For example, if an agent has v1 as its
majority type, when interacting as the speaker with another agent
whose majority type is v2, it still has a higher chance of choosing a
token of v1 and increasing v1’s proportion by adding more tokens
Figure 6. Results with hearer’s preference: covariance without (a) and with (b) variant prestige, Prop with variant prestige (c), and
MaxRange with variant prestige (d). Each line in (a–c) is averaged over 100 simulations. Bars in (d) denote standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033171.g006
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hearer’s variant type distribution to be adjusted by other agents.
For example, if an agent has v1 as its majority type, when
interacting as the hearer with another agent whose majority type is
v2, it will have a higher chance of adding v2 tokens, which will
gradually adjust its variant type distribution to be similar to
others’. Therefore, given the same number of interactions, hearer’s
preference is more efficient for diffusion than speaker’s preference.
In one-speaker-multiple-hearers interactions, the effect of hearer’s
preference will be further enhanced.
With variant prestige, different types of networks show different
degrees of diffusion, as evident in ANCOVA and Figures 6(d) and
7(b). A similar tendency is also shown in Figure S2(d) (except in
fully-connected networks). Apart from ANCOVA, we conduct
post-hoc T-tests on the mean Prop of 100 simulations between
different pairs of networks (see Table 2).
The different degrees of diffusion in these networks can be
ascribed to several structural features of these networks. The first
feature is AD (average degree). As in Table 1, AD is 2 in ring, 4 in
2D lattice. Although in one-speaker-one-hearer interactions, Prop
between these two networks are not significantly different (see
Figure 6(c) and Table 2), in one-speaker-multiple-hearers interac-
tions, the effect of AD is explicit (see Figure S3 and Text S5, where
we further discuss the effect of AD on Prop). In addition, the similar
results between ring and 2D lattice but different results between
2D lattice and scale-free or small-world network indicate that
other structural features are taking effect. And AD alone fails to
explain why star network, having the lowest average degree (1.98),
has the highest Prop.
The second feature is short-cuts. From 2D lattice to small-world
network, rewiring introduces several short-cuts, and Prop in this
network is significantly higher than that in 2D lattice (see Table 2,
Table S1, and Text S5). However, short-cuts cannot explain why
star network, having no such short-cuts, has the highest Prop.
The third feature is LC (level of centrality). Star network has an
extremely centralized structure: there is a hub connecting all other
nodes, and this hub participates in all interactions with other
nodes. Then, with speaker’s preference, the hub has many chances
to update its variant type distribution; with hearer’s preference,
any update of variant type distribution can be quickly spread via
the hub to others. Apart from star network, scale-free network, due
to preferential attachment, also contains hubs connecting many
other nodes, but LC in scale-free network is less than that of star
network. Accordingly, Prop in scale-free network is significantly
smaller than that in star network (see Table 2, Table S1, and Text
S5). Furthermore, in small-world network, rewiring causes some
nodes to have slightly more edges than others, and these nodes will
play similar roles as hubs. However, rewiring is less efficient than
preferential attachment in forming hubs, so Prop in small-world
network is significantly smaller than that in scale-free network (see
Table 2, Table S1, and Text S5). Finally, lacking centralized
structures in other types of networks causes their Prop values to be
significantly smaller than those of star, scale-free, or small-world
networks.
As shown in Table 1, ASPL (average shortest path length)
reflects a combined effect of AD, short-cuts, and LC; if a network
has a high AD, many short-cuts, or a high LC, any two nodes in it
can be connected via a small number of edges. Since star network
has much lower ASPL (1.98), it has much higher Prop, and then
Figure 7. (a) Mean Prop with speaker’s (solid line) and hearer’s preference (dashed line) in different networks. (b) Mean Prop over two
types of preference in different networks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033171.g007
Table 2. Post-hoc T-test results on the mean Prop values of
100 simulations.
Network comparison Post-hoc T-test result
ring vs. 2D lattice t(198)=21.206, p=0.229
2D lattice vs. small-world t(198)=23.239, p,0.001 *
small-world vs. scale-free t(198)=23.884, p,0.001 *
scale-free vs. star t(198)=25.099, p,0.001 *
star vs. fully-connected t(198)=7.482, p,0.001 *
‘‘*’’marks significant difference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033171.t002
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lattice (12.88). Since ring has the highest ASPL (25.25), its Prop is
the lowest.
Discussion
Apart from its successful applications in group selection [39]
and altruism [31], the Price equation is introduced in this paper as
a new approach for studying language change, especially diffusion.
It offers a concise description of evolutionary processes that
abstracts away from specific properties of biological evolution
[29,30]. The covariance and expectation in it decompose a
dynamic process into a selection and an unfaithful replication
component, and quantitative analyses of these components can
lead to a better understanding of the effects of various factors on
diffusion. Meanwhile, this paper also borrows the Po ´lya-urn
dynamics from contagion studies to simulate diffusion. This
dynamics is not language-specific, and simulation results are less
dependent on population size and number of variants or
interactions. Both features make the findings based on this
dynamics also instructive to other socio-cultural phenomena that
involve variant transmission.
Based on the Price equation and Po ´lya-urn dynamics, we
identify that variant prestige is a selective pressure that can
consistently and explicitly drive the spread of variants with high
prestige values in the population. Other factors, including
transmission error, individual preference and influence, and social
structure, play complementary roles in diffusion, once variant
prestige is involved. To be specific, if variants show different
prestige values, transmission error can delay diffusion and help
preserve less prestigious variants; the two types of individual
influence can affect the degree of diffusion in different manners;
hearer’s preference is more efficient for diffusion than speaker’s
preference; and structural features, such as average degree, short-
cuts and level of centrality, can modulate the degree of diffusion.
These theoretical findings can yield important insights and offer
useful guidance on empirical studies of diffusion. As a socio-
cultural phenomenon, language evolution proceeds via individual
learning and cultural transmission [52]. Our findings suggest that
language-external factors in these two aspects have to take effect
via language-internal factors, such as variant prestige. Therefore,
regarding particular diffusion or other linguistic phenomena, we
should not disregard the primary roles of language-internal factors,
nor exaggerate the complementary roles of language-external
factors. Meanwhile, in empirical studies of diffusion, many
observed cases usually occur either as a single history of a
particular language or in a small- or medium-scale group of
individuals. As discussed in Text S4, genuine selective pressures
could be blurred by many factors, such as sampling bias or
historical reasons. Therefore, in order to accurately identify
selective pressures, we need large-scale sampling, systematical
comparison of the available diffusion cases, as well as large-scale,
repetitive simulations and statistical analysis as in this study.
Apart from these findings and insights, this paper also
exemplifies how computer simulation and mathematical analysis
assist each other. The Price equation can quantitatively clarify
selective and non-selective factors, but purely from mathematics, it
is difficult to evaluate how these factors affect each other during
diffusion. Such question can be nicely assessed by simulations
under particular settings. Such a combined approach is also
instructive to study other language evolution phenomena.
Finally, we can envisage some promising future work from the
current study. For instance, heterogeneity (e.g., different
individuals have different prestige values on the same type of
variants) may cause linguistic diversity or coexistence of multiple
types of variants. Simulating contradictory speaker’s and hearer’s
preferences for variants may further reveal the diffusion effi-
ciency of these ways of introducing variants, especially in one-
speaker-multiple-hearer interactions. And various forms of cul-
tural transmission among individuals of the same or different
generations may also modulate the degree of diffusion. All
these can help better elucidate particular diffusion cases in real
languages.
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